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The growth of public debt in emerging market countries during the 1990s and recent financial crises have
once again highlighted the risks associated with fragile public finances in these countries. The debt
restructurings of the 1980s resulted from excessive debt vis-à-vis international banks. The 1990s saw a
strong surge in financing on bond markets, which also brought risks with it and contributed to changing
the nature and pattern of sovereign debt crises.
The 1990s were marked by crises in investor confidence leading to sudden reversals in capital flows and
sharp exchange rate movements, in turn sparking contagion phenomena between different economic
sectors and countries. In this context, the government has a crucial role to play in limiting the impact of the
drop in revenue. When public finances are fragile, doubts about the government’s ability to meet the
financial cost of its intervention can contribute to prolonging the crisis or to triggering unsustainable debt
dynamics.
Emerging market countries that are heavily indebted in foreign currencies and subject to intermittent
access to financial markets are particularly vulnerable to changes in international investor sentiment.
Against this backdrop, the formulation of diagnoses making it possible to identify the risks weighing on
public finances in emerging market countries is an important issue for the international community. In the
light of recent experience, over the past few years the IMF has developed an analytical framework that
should contribute to better account being taken of potential vulnerabilities in this area.
This article begins by recalling that the rise in public debt in emerging market countries has gone hand in
hand with the growth in debt financing and that “capital account crises” have had a significant impact on
public finances. It reviews the traditional analysis of debt sustainability and the factors that may explain
the instability of debt dynamics in emerging market countries. Lastly, it presents the methods for debt
sustainability analysis used by the IMF and the difficulties involved in making diagnoses.
A. Bachellerie, doctoral student, was an intern at the Banque de France, in the International Monetary Relations Division at the time the article was
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T
he acceleration of financial globalisation in
the 1990s gave emerging market countries
new financing opportunities and allowed
them to reinforce their integration into the world
economy. This trend, which resulted in an increase
in securities issuance on “emerging” financial
markets, gave investors new opportunities to
diversify their portfolios. However, it was
accompanied by financial crises which highlighted
the predominant role of market dynamics in the
sudden and massive reversals of capital flows.
The analysis of the causes of these crises has clearly
underscored the responsibility of the economic
policies followed, as well as the risks associated
with fragilities in the banking sector and the
sustainability of exchange rate regimes. By contrast,
there have been few studies dealing specifically
with the issue of the sustainability of emerging
market countries’ public debt, although it increased
considerably during the second half of the 1990s.
The lack of homogenous data on public finances
and the difficulty of isolating the dynamics
affecting public debt go a long way to explaining
this. Nevertheless, the sovereign defaults and debt
restructurings of recent  years, notably in
Argentina, have demonstrated the topicality and
importance of these issues. The inclusion of debt
sustainability analysis in the IMF’s bilateral
surveillance, the development of the analysis of
balance sheet structures and the importance given
to issues of transparency of information reflect the
desire of the international community to identify
the risks weighing on public debt before potentially
uncontrollable dynamics are triggered.
This article proposes to set out the current state of
thinking in this area and to explain how issues
pertaining to the sustainability of emerging market
countries’ public debt have gradually become a cause
for concern for the international community.
It recalls first of all the main features of public debt
developments in emerging economies in the 1990s
and how the growth of public debt has been both
the cause and consequence of serious financial crises
in a context of increased market financing and the
opening of capital accounts. It goes on to highlight
the risk of unsustainability weighing on public debt
dynamics in these countries. Lastly, it describes the
methods used to analyse debt sustainability with a
view to formulating diagnoses.
1| THE UNSTABLE DYNAMICS
OF EMERGING MARKET
PUBLIC DEBT
The debt crises of the 1980s underscored the risks
for emerging market countries of excessive debt
vis-à-vis international banks. The 1990s were
characterised by the growth of public debt financed
via the markets, the development of different types




Having been significantly reduced in the early 1990s
following the introduction of the Brady Plan1 and
the launch of major privatisation programmes, the
public debt of the emerging market countries2 began
to grow again from the mid-1990s onwards.
It increased by an average 10 GDP percentage points
in less than 10 years, rising from 60% in the
mid-1990s to 70% in 2002.3 The increase in debt levels
was far from being uniform and homogenous, with
the differences reflecting in particular the impact of
financial crises. In some countries, debt reached
alarming levels. Public debt far outstripped the 100%
of GDP threshold in Lebanon (178% in 2002) and
Argentina (149% in 2002). Likewise, public debt
levels in Turkey (89% of GDP in 2002), Brazil (78%
of GDP in 2002), India (77% of GDP in 2002) and the
Philippines (77% of GDP in 2002) are well above the
average for emerging market countries.
1 The Brady Plan was based on the conversion of bank loans into government bonds with partial forgiveness of loans, and encouraged bond issues
on the markets. For an analysis of the impact of the Brady Plan on public debt, see for example Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003).
2 Emerging market countries are countries that have access to international financial markets; they are generally defined by reference to the list of
countries making up a particular bond index. In its benchmark study on public debt in emerging markets, the IMF defines the population under
review as the list of the countries making up the EMBI Global Index plus Costa Rica, Indonesia, India, Israel and Jordan. See the IMF, World
Economic Outlook: “Public Debt in Emerging Markets: Is It Too High?” (September 2003).
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The rise in public debt occurred against a general
backdrop of increasing capital flows to emerging
economies in the 1990s, which facilitated the
spectacular growth of bond markets (see Chart 1).
This radically changed public debt financing in
emerging markets in the 1990s. Banks, which the
experience of the crises of the 1980s had made more
cautious and which were faced with a new regulatory
environment (introduction of the Cooke ratio in
1988), reviewed their policy of financing sovereign
States by syndicated loans and also became active
on bond markets. Accordingly, following the
securitisation of bank loans under the Brady Plan,
the relative decline in syndicated loans in external
public debt compared with debt financing continued
in the  1990s. In 1988, one  year before the
implementation of the Brady Plan, the stock of
public debt held by private creditors in the form of
bank loans totalled USD 250 billion, whereas
government bonds amounted to less than
USD 50 billion. In 2003, bank loans accounted for
only USD 100 billion, whereas bond debt totalled
USD 300 billion.4 Thus, the stock of government
securities issued by emerging market countries on
international markets increased more than five-fold
between 1994 and 2000 (see Charts 2 and 3).
4 For a summarised presentation of the development of public debt financing in emerging markets, see IMF (2004c)
5 For an analysis of the growth of national bond markets, see BIS (2002)
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Furthermore, emerging market countries, in
accordance with the recommendations of
international financial institutions, have sought to
develop national bond markets. As a result, the total
amount of government bonds issued by emerging
economies on local markets doubled between 1994
and 2000 from USD 526 billion to USD 1023 billion5
and gave rise to growth of nearly 10 GDP percentage
points in public bond debt (see Chart 4).66 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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Chart 4
Public bond debt on domestic markets
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The size and structure of local bond markets vary
greatly across emerging markets and they are difficult
to compare with bond markets in industrialised
countries. The major difference lies in the difficulty
faced by emerging market countries in obtaining
long-term financing on the national market.
1|2 Complex interaction
between crisis and debt
The Mexican crisis (1994) was the first in a series of
financial crises that were collectively dubbed “capital
account crises”. These episodes highlighted new
destabilising dynamics affecting capital movements:
the crises of the 1990s were characterised by the
scale and abruptness of reversals of capital flows
leading to the “sudden stop” of financing towards
emerging economies (see Calvo, 1998). While the
mechanisms at work differed from case to case,
investor sentiment and foreign exchange rate
movements play a major role in the way crises
unfold. Crises are fuelled by the behaviour of
international investors, which explains the
phenomenon of contagion from one country to
another. This phenomenon, which is fostered by the
opening-up of capital markets in the emerging
economies and their increased integration into
international markets, has blurred the distinctions
between the concepts of exchange rate crisis,
banking crisis and debt crisis.
PUBLIC FINANCES WEAKENED BY FINANCIAL
AND EXCHANGE RATE CRISES
Economic and financial crises have a direct effect
on public finances by reducing the fiscal revenue
base. Added to this are the cost of part of the impact
of the financial crisis borne by the State and
valuation effects on public debt. Thus, in the case
of the Asian “twin crises” (1997-98), the banking
crisis resulted in substantial costs for governments
associated with rescuing the banking system
(nearly 16% of GDP in Thailand, more than 50%
in Indonesia), while the exchange rate crisis
swelled the weight of foreign currency public debt.
However, given that the economies affected were
underpinned by sound public finances, the
sustainability of public debt was not called into
question.
By contrast, in a country whose public finances
are already fragile, the absorption by the State
of the costs of a banking crisis can have
a destabilising impact. In Turkey, the
implementation in 1999 of an IMF programme to
reduce the current account deficit and combat
inflation was undermined by a banking crisis
(in October 2000), which led to the free float of
the pound and to significant growth in public debt.
However, the IMF’s massive intervention and
prospects of negotiations opening on membership
of the European Union helped to avoid a
restructuring of Turkey’s public debt.
Even in the absence of a banking crisis, a crisis of
confidence regarding a country’s currency may
force the authorities to abandon a pegging regime
and lead to a sharp surge of debt denominated in
foreign currencies or indexed to the exchange rate.
Thus, the end of Brazil’s “crawling peg” in 1999
resulted in a 9 GDP-percentage-point increase in
public debt between 1998 and 1999, bringing it to
53% of GDP. Once again in 2002, although the real
had been allowed to float, the forthcoming
elections prompted a crisis of confidence
regarding Brazil’s currency, which led to a further
swelling of public debt by nearly 10 GDP
percentage points.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 67
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Box 1
Three examples of crises and their links with public debt
The Mexican, Thai and Brazilian crises are three examples of capital account crises that have in common the fact that they
did not spark a default on public debt, but led to a strong depreciation of the national currency and a deterioration of the
state of public finances.
Mexico (1994-1995)
• Widening of the current account deficit (9.8% of GDP
in 1993, 7% in 1994) and financing via capital inflows,
largely short-term.
• Against the backdrop of a tightening of US monetary
policy and domestic political unrest, capital outflows
(March-April 1994), a decline in official reserves and
issuance of short-term government securities indexed
to the dollar known as ‘Tesobonos’.
• Renewed crisis of confidence in November, float of
the peso on 22 December. A USD 50 billion rescue plan
is put in place by the US Treasury and the IMF in order
to avoid a default on public debt.
• Between 1994 and 1996 public debt grew by a total of
18 GDP percentage points.
Thailand (1997-1998)
• Strong growth (GDP up by 5.9% in 1996), widening of
the current account deficit (7.9% of GDP in 1996), real
appreciation of the baht, capital inflows (9.2% of GDP
in 1996). Banking sector fragile.
• Capital outflows at the end of 1996, which then
accelerate, banking crisis, interventions to prop up the
exchange rate.
• July 1997, baht floated: it loses 20% of its value in one
month, USD 4 billion IMF programme.
• Continued fall of the baht, stepping-up of the IMF
programme and sharp economic slowdown; late 1998,
reorientation of programme to bolster recovery.
• Between 1997 and 1999 public debt grows by 19 GDP
percentage points.
Brazil (1998-2002)
• Weak growth; substantial public deficit (7.9% of GDP
in 1998) and current account deficit (4.3% of GDP
in 1998).
• In the wake of the Asian and Russian crises, capital
outflows and rise in interest rates. December 1998,
USD 42 billion rescue plan including USD 18 billion from
the IMF; real floated in January 1999.
• Public debt grows by 9 GDP percentage points in 1999.
• In the run-up to the presidential elections in
October 2002, concerns about the level of public debt
push spreads to 1,500 basis points; real depreciates
sharply (by 18% between March and June). A new IMF
programme totalling USD 30 billion is approved.
• Public debt grows by 10 GDP percentage points
in 2002.
Mexico: public debt and exchange rate
(as a % of GDP) (USD)
1991 1993 1995 1997
External public debt (left-hand scale)
Domestic public debt (left-hand scale)
















Thailand: public debt and exchange rate
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Brazil: public debt and exchange rate
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CRISES LINKED TO THE UNSUSTAINABILITY
OF FISCAL POLICY
Doubts about public debt sustainability can trigger
a crisis of confidence; the resulting exchange rate
crisis generally leads to an increase in the foreign
currency debt burden. The Mexican crisis, triggered
in 1994 by doubts about Mexico’s ability to honour
its external public debt indexed to the dollar
(Tesobonos), resulted in a surge in public debt of
20 GDP percentage points. Subsequently, in Russia,
the deteriorating state of public finances and the
authorities’ lack of credibility led to an exchange
rate crisis and to default on domestic and then
external public debt in 1998.
The Argentine crisis thus appears to follow the pattern
of the debt crises of the 1990s; in fact, however, it
constitutes a break with the previous crises.
The Argentine crisis was a delayed-action sustainability
crisis: Argentina, which had followed an IMF
programme since 1991, was for a long time presented
as a ‘model country’ with regard to implementation of
economic and financial reforms (notably regarding
financial liberalisation and privatisation). While, during
the period prior to the country’s default, debate focused
on the risks and advantages of a change of exchange
rate regime, the vulnerabilities related to Argentina’s
public debt were greatly underestimated. As noted by
the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO)6, the
Argentine crisis revealed “debt intolerance” in some
emerging market economies. The case of Argentina
illustrates the numerous and interlocking factors at
work in the financial crises of the 1990s: fiscal and
more general institutional fragility, inadequate
structural reform, the constraints associated a pegged
exchange rate regime, foreign currency debt, contagion
effects from the Brazilian crisis, and more widely the
impact of external shocks.
The Argentine default also led to a new awareness
on the part of the international community of the
economic and social risks associated with defaulting
on public debt. Subsequently, discussions began on
the different approaches facilitating the orderly
resolution of debt crises. These included the
proposal of a sovereign debt restructuring
mechanism (SDRM) under the aegis of the IMF, the
proposal of a code of good conduct for sovereign debt
restructuring at the instigation of the Banque de
France, and the development of collective action
clauses with respect to bonds, advocated in
particular by the G10.
While the proposal to set up a formal mechanism
was not implemented due to a lack of consensus on
the issue, the idea of a code of good conduct was
taken up by the main creditors and issuers on
emerging markets and paved the way for the
“Principles for stable capital flows and fair debt
restructuring for emerging markets” presented at the
G20 in Berlin in 2004. Similarly, the inclusion of
collective action clauses in bond issues on emerging
markets has become increasingly widespread. At the
same time, discussions about debt sustainability in
emerging market countries continued, with a view
notably to improving the diagnostic tools available





For emerging market countries that are subject to
intermittent access to financial markets, doubts
about the sustainability of their public debt can have
a devastating effect on their economies. The concept
of sustainability encompasses questions about
government solvency and debt liquidity, which are
particularly pressing in emerging market countries.
2|1 Public debt sustainability:
solvency and liquidity
A country’s public debt is sustainable if its fiscal
policy can be pursued without excessive adjustment
in the future. Debt sustainability requires both that
the country is regarded as being solvent, i.e. that its
creditors have a positive opinion regarding its ability
to repay its debt over the long term, and liquid,
i.e. that it is able to roll over maturing debt. These
factors depend largely on the confidence of creditors
and the credibility of the national authorities.
6 IMF (2004d)Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 69
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GOVERNMENT SOLVENCY: AN ASSESSMENT
OF ITS DEBT REPAYMENT CAPACITY
A sovereign debtor is solvent if its discounted
primary surpluses are at least equivalent to its initial
public debt (Agenor and Montiel, 1996; Roubini,
2001). Analysis of a government’s solvency falls
within a different legal framework than the approach
followed in the case of a private entity for which it
is possible to realise assets held as part of bankruptcy
proceedings. The absence of such proceedings in
the case of sovereign States derives from the
principle of the inviolability of the State and the
unseizability of public assets. The government is
nonetheless obliged to maintain intertemporal fiscal
balance (see Appendix I), given that its creditors are
not ready to hold the public debt indefinitely, and
therefore the country cannot indebt itself ad
infinitum: this is the “no-Ponzi-game” condition.7
The intertemporal fiscal constraint defines a debt
equilibrium path linking the interest rate and the rate
of long-term economic growth with future discounted
primary surpluses. Two variables appear essential:
firstly, the primary surplus that enables the
government to release funds to meet debt repayments;
and secondly, the interest rate constituting the
financial burden weighing on the debt.
However, the solvency criterion is a theoretical
concept of limited practical value. It cannot be used
to determine a benchmark debt threshold: in theory,
irrespective of the initial level of the debt, the fiscal
constraint can be respected. Moreover, solvency is
a concept whose dynamics are unsatisfactorily taken
account of in an uncertain environment: a country
that is solvent at a given time may become insolvent
in the wake of shocks.
As a consequence, it is common to talk about fiscal
policy sustainability and, by extension, public debt
sustainability.
Public debt is only sustainable as long as the country
is solvent. On the other hand, the country may
remain solvent while its debt is unsustainable and
the authorities may subsequently choose to alter
the fiscal policy pursued.
In practice, the country’s ability to stabilise its debt
levels relative to GDP over the short and medium-term
is often used to measure debt sustainability: if it can
be stabilised, the debt is sustainable. Conversely, a
steady rise in the public debt-to-GDP ratio may prompt
a crisis of investor confidence.8 Accordingly, doubts
may arise regarding the future ability of the authorities
to take the necessary fiscal measures or regarding the
impact of such measures on economic growth
(Roubini, 2001). If the country has foreign currency
debt, stabilising public debt entails the exchange rate
effect being factored in. Any depreciation of the
currency requires an increase in the primary surplus
to stabilise the debt.
THE LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINT:
REFINANCING MATURING DEBT
A country must continually refinance its maturing
debt and can therefore experience crises of liquidity
if this refinancing is not ensured. A liquidity crisis
arises when the assets immediately available are not
sufficient to cover the servicing of the debt;
it can arise without the country’s solvency being called
into question. However, as was illustrated by the
sovereign debt crises in emerging market countries
in the 1990s, it is difficult ex ante to distinguish
situations of insolvency from pure liquidity crises.
Investor perception seems here to be a crucial
variable that determines the point at which the crisis
is triggered. Indeed, debt crises are sparked by a
liquidity crisis, generally as a result of difficulties
in refinancing debt on international markets.
Taking account of self-fulfilling behaviour makes it
possible to show how a liquidity crisis can
degenerate into a solvency crisis in “crisis zones”
(Cole and Kehoe, 1998).9 In countries that display
fragile public finances, a crisis of confidence
increases the probability of default. The additional
financing cost resulting from this helps to confirm
investors’ pessimism.10
The principal difficulty relates to the determination
of factors that can bring about a crisis of confidence.
Two explanations are put forward by the literature.
7 This was a fraud mounted by C. Ponzi around 1920, in which contributions from new investors in the “chain” were used to pay interest to the first investors.
8 Chalk and Hemming (2000).
9 For a discussion of the conditions that can lead to sequences of events of this type, see Chamon (2004).
10 A simple presentation of this mechanism can be found in Detragiache (1996).70 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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Firstly, the crisis can be triggered by doubts
concerning the country’s willingness to repay its
debt. In theory, the country only has an interest in
honouring its obligations if the cost of default is
greater than the adjustment necessitated by
adhering to the repayment schedule. However, the
experiences of Russia and Ecuador, which returned
to the markets shortly after their default, limit the
relevance of arguments about the economic cost
associated with default and a cost/benefit analysis
of defaulting. In this context, investors’ perceptions
of the “good faith” of the government in question
are crucial.
Secondly, the crisis can be triggered by doubts
concerning the country’s ability to repay its debt
in the light of the economy’s fundamentals.
Three schematic scenarios are advanced by Chui
et alii (2000). In the first scenario, where there are
no concerns about the country’s “fundamentals”,
it is rational for each creditor to continue to finance
the country, which encounters no financing
problems. In the second scenario, where the
country’s “fundamentals” have deteriorated and the
country appears to be insolvent, creditors do not
renew their loans, a liquidity crisis is triggered and
reveals the country’s insolvency. Lastly, in the third
scenario, where the country’s fundamentals are in
an intermediate zone, a liquidity crisis cannot be
ruled out but its occurrence cannot be accurately
predicted.
A crisis of confidence within this intermediate zone
is not inevitable: the possibility of multiple equilibria
stems from a lack of co-ordination between creditors.
The equilibrium point is unknown before the
decision taken by each investor whether to refinance
the country or not. The equilibrium may be
sub-optimal while still resulting from rational
behaviour on the part of investors: creditors
minimise the cost of finding information by
following the market trend.
Models that incorporate investor behaviour help to
explain some aspects of crises of confidence, but
are not sufficient to account for the proliferation of
crises in emerging market countries. The experience
of the 1990s highlighted the fact that crises arise
from the confrontation between investor sentiment
and the fundamental vulnerabilities of emerging
economies. Thus, a change in investor risk aversion
or contagion phenomena can precipitate a crisis;
however, the internal fragilities of the countries in
question are at the root of the crisis.
2|2 Risk concentration in emerging
market countries
The concentration of risk in emerging market
countries and their reliance on external financing
flows expose them notably to the risk of crises of
confidence that can trigger dynamics of
uncontrollable debt. Among the many factors11 that
can explain the fragility of emerging market
countries, three deserve a mention: “original sin”
and the consequences of exposure to exchange rate
movements, the imperfect nature of information on
emerging economies and the risks associated with
herd behaviour, and the instability of capital
movements and the resulting impact on emerging
economies.
“ORIGINAL SIN”
One of the fragilities of emerging market countries
derives from their inability to issue securities in their
own currencies on international markets.
This results in their accumulating foreign currency
debt (“original sin” – see Eichengreen, 1999).
This constraint is often accompanied by difficulty
in obtaining long-term financing. However, the
shorter the debt maturity, the higher the risk of a
refinancing crisis.
To ensure servicing of its foreign currency debt, the
country has to generate foreign currency resources
over a long period, with the risk of being faced with
an asymmetry between debt denominated in a
strong currency and resources denominated in
the local  currency  – “currency  mismatch”.12
The refinancing of foreign currency debt imposes a
liquidity constraint that links confidence in the
currency to the assessment about the country’s
solvency: an investor will only lend money as long
as he has a positive assessment regarding the
11 Many factors are at play: fragility of institutions, volatility of fiscal revenue, degree of openness to trade, past record of default, etc.
See IMF (2003b), Kaminsky (2003).
12 For an analysis of the risks associated with this kind of situation, see Goldstein, Turner (2004).Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 71
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country’s ability to repay its debts over the long term
and to have available the foreign currency needed
to service its foreign currency debt.
The interaction between the fiscal constraint and
the external constraint13 further complicates the
analysis of emerging market countries which, unlike
developed countries, run the risk of being
temporarily denied access to international markets.
In practice, public debt sustainability is generally
called into question by a refinancing crisis on
international markets. The liquidity crisis may then
lead to an exchange rate crisis which in turn may
trigger a debt crisis. The crisis may result from a
liquidity shortfall in the private sector – this was
the case in the Asian crisis in 1997 – or in the public
sector (Mexico in 1994).
IMPERFECT NATURE OF INFORMATION
ON EMERGING ECONOMIES
Unlike industrialised countries for which high
quality information is very rapidly available,
emerging market countries suffer from the
imperfect nature of the information concerning
them. The absence of certain data, the poor quality
of the available information14 and patchy knowledge
of the countries in question can give rise to an
inaccurate assessment of their fundamentals.
A return/risk analysis is even more problematic for
emerging market countries given that it is
sometimes very difficult to distinguish credit risk
from exchange rate risk.
A system in which information is scarce and
expensive to obtain encourages the development of
herd behaviour, which is liable to trigger
self-fulfilling crises. In the context of bank financing,
the bank acts as the depositors’ “representative” to
monitor the quality of the investments made
(Diamond, 1984); the consequence of a deterioration
of the quality of investment is the cessation of new
financing. On the markets, the information available
is used to determine the price of securities and the
impact on quantities is indirect but can be more
sudden. In the light of information asymmetries,
investors may be prone to herd behaviour, following
13 Which includes public debt and private debt.
14 Thus, the recording in the reserves of the Korean central bank of funds placed with Korean banks abroad (which turned out to be unavailable at
the time of the 1997 crisis) contributed to clouding the signals sent out to investors.
those investors regarded as being the best informed.
This can fuel contagion phenomena.
The difficulty in establishing the credibility of the
economic policy in place, another feature of emerging
market countries, augments the risk of a crisis of
confidence and therefore reduces the authorities’
room for manoeuvre: in an uncertain environment,
the probability of default perceived by investors
increases (Diamond, 1989). In this situation, creditors
base their decisions on the country’s default record
and tolerate a lower level of debt than in developed
countries (Reinhardt, Rogoff, Savastano, 2003).
It has therefore become crucial for the international
community to have at its disposal tools that can be
used to make reliable diagnoses. The efforts undertaken
at the instigation of the G7 and the IMF with regard to
improving transparency, the quality of statistics and
the dissemination of data have enabled considerable
progress to be made, which has helped to improve the
overall assessment of risk. Accordingly, the publication
of reports drawn up by the IMF as part of its Article IV
missions and Financial Sector Assessment Programmes
(FSAP) has become more widespread; and the major
emerging countries now comply with the Special Data
Dissemination Standard (SDDS), etc. However, further
progress is needed with regard to the quality and
harmonisation of the statistics available.
INSTABILITY OF CAPITAL FLOWS
Financial liberalisation in emerging market
countries has encouraged the placing of government
securities on the markets, thereby exposing the
financing of public administrations to the reversals
of capital flows. Claims on these countries constitute
a very narrow asset class that is characterised by
high returns corresponding to the assessment made
regarding the level of risk (outside of crisis periods,
over one-half of issues were concentrated on
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela). Prices are
correspondingly volatile: when a country defaults,
emerging securities across the board may be subject
to portfolio reallocations linked notably to
competition from comparable assets such as US high
yield securities.72 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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Box 2
Difficulties in the statistical analysis of public debt
in emerging market countries
The lack of reliable data on public finances contributes to the difficulty of analysing debt sustainability in emerging
markets (see IMF, 2003b). The problems encountered are of several kinds:
Availability of data: generally speaking, information on external debt is more plentiful and more detailed than that on
public debt; many countries have debt series that cover a limited time period; a breakdown of public debt between short-term
and long-term debt or by currency of issue is rarely available.
Coverage of data: the data available for emerging market countries only rarely include State-guaranteed borrowing and
the debts of local authorities and state-owned companies, etc.
Uniformity of data: comparisons between different countries are often problematic given the differences in the definitions
used.
Experience shows that emerging market countries
are affected by reversals of capital flows – known as
“sudden stops” – leading to disruptions in access to
markets. Thus, the Mexican crisis, which led to
capital outflows accounting for around 6% of GDP,
was preceded by capital inflows representing 27.1%
of GDP between 1989 and 1994 (Calvo, 1998).
The intrinsic fragilities of emerging market
countries are therefore compounded by the volatility
of sources of external financing. In periods of crisis,
while investor risk aversion mounts, economic
policy is greatly constrained by the need to restore
investor confidence. As a consequence, unlike
industrialised countries, which can respond to
fluctuations in capital flows by loosening economic
policy, emerging market countries are forced to
pursue procyclical policies.15 Thus, as economic
activity contracts, governments reduce fiscal
deficits, both to persuade investors of the credibility
of their economic policy and to reduce external
deficits. Likewise, monetary policy is generally
tightened in order to retain foreign capital and
defend the national currency. Emerging market
countries thus get into debt during periods of economic
recovery and repay their debts during periods of crisis.
3| MAKING DIAGNOSES
The proliferation of defaults16 and payment
difficulties on sovereign bond debt in the 1990s
illustrated the need to identify the risks weighing
on the ability of countries to service their debt and
served as a reminder of the difficulty of reversing
negative debt dynamics at a late stage. Making
reliable diagnoses very early on is therefore crucial
both for private creditors and the international
community.
The current focus on issues of transparency, quality
of information and signalling effects demonstrates
this concern. The International Financial
Institutions, in particular the IMF, have continually
sought to improve multilateral surveillance and to
get a better grasp of the dynamics at work.
15 Calvo and Reinhart (1999), Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004), Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004).
16 Whereas no defaults on bond debt had been recorded before 1998, 9 countries defaulted between 1998 and 2001 (see Moody’s, 2003 and
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3|1 Fiscal constraint
and debt indicators
Using macroeconomic indicators, several
approaches enable a rapid diagnosis of public debt
sustainability to be made. However, their limitations
are very real and it is difficult to use them as the
basis for economic policy recommendations.
CALCULATION OF DEBT INDICATORS
A preliminary empirical approach to debt
sustainability may be based on the search for
benchmark reference thresholds17 following the
example of the solution chosen for the HIPC
initiative on external debt. However, the theory does
not permit a single threshold to determine debt
unsustainability. Empirically, risk zones can be
identified: Reinhart, Rogof and Savastano (2003) show
that countries that have a significant default history
cannot – on a long-term basis – sustain high external
debt (constituting for these countries external debt
in excess of 15% or 20% of GDP). With regard to
public debt, the IMF has found that over one-half of
defaults (55%) have occurred when the public debt-
to-GDP ratio was below 60% and over one-third
(35%) when the ratio was below 40%. The IMF has
thus defined a risk zone which, depending on the
methods used, can start at 25% of GDP.18
The threshold-based approach revealed its
limitations with the emergence of capital account
crises: it is difficult to take account of the
transformation in financing methods seen on
financial markets using indicators based on a
historical approach. For example, Mexico reduced
its level of public debt by 40 GDP points between
1985 and 1994 to 35.8%19 of GDP at the time of the
crisis. Mexico’s fiscal balance was even positive
in 1992 (0.3% of GDP).
ANALYSIS OF THE TREND
When a country’s public debt increases over
several years, stabilising debt levels may constitute
a simple response to prevent a sovereign debt crisis.
17 For an analysis of advanced indicators of debt crises, see Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003).
18 IMF (2003b).
19 IMF (2003a).
It is possible, according to Blanchard (1990), to
calculate the primary surplus required to stabilise
the debt-to-GDP ratio. The difference compared with
the actual primary surplus constitutes the fiscal
gap. If the latter is positive, the debt is deemed to
be unsustainable. The IMF (see  the WEO,
September 2003), has found that few emerging
market countries have the level of primary surplus
needed to stabilise let alone reduce the public
debt-to-GDP ratio. Similarly, the tax rate required
to stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio may be calculated.
A gap between the equilibrium rate and the actual
tax rate also leads to the conclusion that the debt is
unsustainable. These calculations provide a direct
measure of the efforts a country needs to make to
stabilise its debt.
While the advantage of these indicators is that they
can be easily produced, they are difficult to interpret.
In particular, for countries with relatively high debt
levels, stabilising the debt-to-GDP ratio is no
guarantee against crises of confidence sparked by
investor risk aversion. As a consequence, in some
cases, reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio, not merely
stabilising it, is necessary.
The intertemporal fiscal constraint also makes it
possible to ascertain whether the country’s debt is
excessive, by comparing the debt stock at a given
date with discounted future primary surpluses
using assumptions of long-term variables
(see Appendix 1). This approach allows a diagnosis
to be made at a specific point in time that can be
adjusted in accordance with the changes anticipated
in the growth potential and variations in fiscal policy.
This method has enabled the IMF (2003b) to show
that the actual public debt ratio is 2.5 times higher
than that suggested by an analysis derived from
the theoretical approach (25%).
Like the static indicator approach, the use of criteria
based on debt stabilisation or the intertemporal fiscal
constraint is not wholly suited to the new financing
structure of emerging market countries. Indeed, the
volatility of macroeconomic variables in these
countries and the exposure to interest rate or
exchange rate dynamics make any approach based
on estimates of long-term variables tenuous.74 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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Box 3
Paris Club: HIPC initiative/debt sustainability
From 1989 onwards, following the example of the London Club, the Paris Club began agreeing to partial cancellation debt
for LDCs (least developed countries) whose debt-service costs were at least equivalent to 30% of their export revenue.
The initial terms of cancellation were decided at the Toronto G7 (1988) followed by the so-called London terms (G7 summit
in December 1991) and the Naples terms (1994), which increased the cancellation to 67% of consolidated non-ODA debt.
In view of the persistent debt problems in these countries, the IMF and the World Bank jointly proposed a new mechanism
aimed at lasting relief for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC). The initiative was reinforced at the G7 summit in Cologne
in June 1999.
The initiative consists in reducing to sustainable levels the external debt burden of low-income countries whose debt is
– in net present value terms – more than 150% of their exports. For commodity producing economies an alternative
criterion, a debt-to-fiscal revenue ratio of above 250% has been used.
A list of 41 countries (potential HIPC countries) has been drawn up by the IMF and the World Bank; 27 countries have
benefited from debt relief from Paris Club creditors amounting to USD 19 billion.
3|2 Taking account of uncertainties
and financial vulnerabilities
In order to take better account of the complexity of
recent financial crises, the IMF has radically
changed the analytical framework used to measure
debt sustainability.
THE IMF’S DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS:
A DYNAMIC APPROACH
The IMF has developed a framework that
incorporates an analysis of public and external debt
sustainability. Projections for public and external
debt are made for the medium term (five years),
using a baseline scenario. This central scenario,
which is based on the assumption of wholesale
application of the recommendations of IMF
programmes, generally shows a reduction in
debt-to-GDP ratios. Alternative scenarios make it
possible to estimate the conditions and reforms
necessary to avoid a deterioration in the debt ratio.
Lastly, other scenarios are based on a continuation
of the historical trend of explanatory variables of
debt. In order to ensure that the analysis is robust,
the IMF applies shocks to the different variables in
order to simulate crisis scenarios and to take account
of the gaps observed historically.
This approach provides a general framework
whereby an analysis can be applied uniformly to
IMF members with a view to identifying a country’s
vulnerability to risks of debt unsustainability.
The aim is to be able to adjust economic policy at a
very early stage before dynamics of destabilising
flows are triggered. Analysis of public and external
debt sustainability has thus been systematically
included in the preparation of IMF programmes.
The original framework20 was adapted to take
account of the first exercises conducted.21 It has
moreover been applied as part of bilateral
surveillance carried out by the IMF under Article IV
of its statutes.22 So far, it is still too early to draw any
lessons from this initiative and its impact on the
IMF’s activity.  The experience built up through the
application of the same approach to a large sample
should make it possible gradually to improve the
diagnosis.
However, capital account crises have shown that an
imbalance in one sector of the economy can be
20 See IMF (2002).
21 See IMF (2003a).
22 IMF (2004b).Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 75
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passed on to the public sector. The recognition of
the risks posed by a fragile balance sheet structure
has led to the efforts undertaken with regard to the
public sector being complemented by a balance sheet
approach to other sectors.
A COMPLEMENT: THE BALANCE SHEET APPROACH
The balance sheet approach is an analytical
framework that makes it possible to identify in
aggregate balance sheets by economic sector
vulnerabilities linked to imbalances that cannot be
observed in a consolidated balance sheet for the
country as a whole.23 It shows up four types of
potential balance sheet imbalances: currency
mismatches, maturity mismatches, capital structure
problems24 and solvency problems. This method can
be applied to the public sector but in this context
does not provide any conclusions regarding debt
sustainability, unlike an analysis in terms of flows.
On the other hand, the vulnerabilities that the
balance sheet approach reveals allow illiquidity risk
to be better determined.
The IMF has sought to incorporate this approach in
its research on the risks associated with the level
and structure of a country’s debt.25 However, so far
the balance sheet approach has not made it possible
to put together a set of indicators that can easily be
used to conduct comparative analyses of different
countries (mainly on account of statistical
difficulties).
Moreover, it is difficult to take account of off-balance
sheet liabilities using the balance sheet approach.
But analysis of contingent liabilities (liabilities that
materialise when a specific and essentially uncertain
event takes place) must also be included in the work
undertaken on debt sustainability. Contingent
liabilities may take different forms such as the
funding by the public authorities of bank
restructuring, the cost of natural disasters, or the
reclassification of local authorities’ liabilities as part
of the country’s public debt. Likewise, it is also
possible to include an estimate of the implicit
liability of ensuring the production of public goods
(e.g. social liabilities). The main difficulty stems from
the uncertain and specific nature of situations
revealing contingent liabilities, which makes them
difficult to factor in.
The improvement of sustainability analyses and the
account taken of balance sheet structures constitute
progress in terms of the methods used to make
diagnoses, which will gradually lead to better
detection of the risks weighing on public debt
sustainability. These advances do not, however,
represent a guarantee against sovereign default.
Thus, as indicated by the IMF’s Independent
Evaluation Bureau, debt sustainability analysis
would have been of little use for Argentina in 2001,
given the overestimation of the level of debt deemed
sustainable and the underestimation of the potential
impact of the abandonment of the currency board.
In the final analysis, beyond the formulation of
diagnoses, it is national governments’ capacity to
effectively counter the internal fragilities of
emerging economies that is the decisive factor.
23 IMF (2004a), Allen et alii (2002).
24 The capital structure risk relates to the financing method of the economy depending on the types of instruments used and the corresponding
leverage.
25 IMF (2003d, 2004c).76 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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The experience of the 1990s illustrates the difficulties involved in analysing the determinants of crises in
emerging market countries. Numerous factors are at work and the growth of public debt has contributed
to increasing the risks weighing on these countries. It has therefore become crucial to make diagnoses at
an early stage in order to avoid the triggering of the uncontrollable dynamics that can lead to debt crises.
Nevertheless, in spite of the progress made in the methods used to make a diagnosis, it will always be
difficult to decide on the level of debt deemed acceptable by the financial markets. Governments have no
choice in this regard but to gradually build up strong credibility on the basis of the efforts undertaken in the
areas of fiscal policy and structural reform.
Given the difficulties involved in significantly reducing high levels of debt, a policy that principally consists
in relying on rapid growth in order to maintain a debt ratio that is acceptable to the markets is a risky
gamble. As a consequence, preventing excessive accumulation of public debt through sound economic
policy remains the best means of reducing the risk of crisis.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 77
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APPENDIX  1
Government solvency, debt repayment capacity
and stabilisation of the debt-to-GDP ratio
Intertemporal government solvency
In each period, governments are faced with immediate fiscal constraints which must be adhered to ex post
and which reflect the debt dynamics:
s b


















(4) b* r* – g – ε (1 + g)
= t st
(1 + g) (1 + ε)
bt* represents the amount of debt in foreign currency at time t as a percentage of GDP; for the sake of simplicity, we
shall assume that the debt is entirely in foreign currencies. st corresponds to the primary surplus at t (fiscal balance
excluding interest on the debt) as a percentage of GDP, rt* to the nominal rate of interest on the debt in foreign
currency, gt to the nominal growth rate and εt to the variation in the directly quoted nominal exchange rate.
Any appreciation of the national currency (ε > 0) permits a reduction in the foreign currency debt burden.
The intertemporal fiscal constraint is obtained using equation (1), by adding up the immediate constraints:
The country’s creditors refuse to extend long-term loans merely to ensure the payment of interest on prior debt:
this is the no-Ponzi-game condition. It means that, over the long term, the growth rate of the debt must be
lower than the growth rate of the interest rate. The last term, which is the discounted value of future public
debt, should therefore converge to zero in the limit.
The intertemporal fiscal constraint is thus adhered to when the discounted primary surpluses cover current debt b*t:
Long-term stabilisation of the debt-to-GDP ratio
The long-term stabilisation of the debt-to-GDP ratio requires a level of primary surplus in terms of GDP,
s such that:
If the GDP growth rate in foreign currency is higher than the interest rate (r* < g + ε), the country can stabilise
its debt as a percentage of GDP while still having primary deficits (and therefore fiscal deficits all the more so).
Long-term debt can be stabilised without the country being solvent. Indeed, if the debt-to-GDP ratio is stable
over the long term, the no-Ponzi-game condition requires that the GDP growth rate in foreign currencies be
lower than the interest rate, a condition that is not necessarily met. On the other hand, when this condition is
satisfied, stabilising the debt does not prevent the intertemporal fiscal constraint from being respected.
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APPENDIX 2
Chronology of defaults on bond debt
) s n o i l l i m D S U (
r a e Y y r t n u o C n o d e t l u a f e d t b e d l a t o T
8 9 9 1 y l u Ja l e u z e n e V0 7 2
8 9 9 1 t s u g u A a i s s u R 6 3 3 3 7
8 9 9 1 r e b m e t p e Se n i a r k U2 2 4 1
8 9 9 1 r e b m e v o N n a t s i k a P 0 5 7
9 9 9 1 t s u g u Ar o d a u c E3 0 6 6
0 0 0 2 y r a u n a J e n i a r k U 3 6 0 1
0 0 0 2 r e b m e t p e Su r e P0 7 8 4
1 0 0 2 e n u J a v o d l o M 5 4 1
1 0 0 2 r e b m e v o Na n i t n e g r A8 6 2 2 8
Source: Moody’s